

American Evangelicals and Domestic Versus International Climate Policy

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Abstract

Since every fourth American is an evangelical, their position on climate policy is important to determining the role that the United States could play in global climate cooperation. Do evangelicals oppose all climate policies, or are they particularly opposed to certain types of policies? We argue that American evangelicals oppose climate policy due to their distrust of international cooperation and institutions, which has been a prominent feature of evangelical politics since the beginning of the Cold War. Using data from the 2011 Faith and Global Policy Challenges survey, which investigated the relationship between religion and policy in a sample of 1,496 American adults, we find support for the theory. Evangelicals are equally likely to support domestic climate policy as other Americans, but they are approximately 6% less likely to support international treaties on climate cooperation. These findings suggest that proponents of climate policy could win the evangelicals on their side by focusing on domestic action, instead of multilateral negotiations.

Keywords: international cooperation, religion, climate change, climate policy, evangelicalism, public opinion

1 Introduction

In the last decade, evangelical Christians have been a source of both hope and despair for climate activists in the United States. When the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) joined Rick Warren and other religious leaders to endorse the Evangelical Climate Initiative in 2007, there appeared to be a decisive shift in evangelical thinking towards action on climate change. However, in the same year, the powerful Southern Baptist Convention issued a resolution that condemned proposals to regulate CO₂ emissions as “dangerous,” and Focus On The Family’s James Dobson suggested NAE Vice President Richard Cizik should resign if “he cannot be trusted to articulate the views of American evangelicals on climate issues” (Southern Baptist Convention, 2007; Focus on Family, 2007).

The position of American evangelicals on climate change may be a central factor in global climate policy. Countries like China and India probably will not accept binding emissions commitments without America’s leadership or reciprocation. Within the United States, slightly more than 26% of the adult population identified themselves as members of evangelical Protestant congregations in a survey conducted in 2007.¹ Such a large religious bloc will be politically important, either as help or hindrance, in any American commitment to emissions reductions.

Do evangelicals oppose all types of climate policy? Or, are they opposed to specific *types* of climate policy? We argue that evangelical beliefs have a strong effect on a person’s preferences over the type of climate change policy – domestic versus international – rather than a blanket effect on all climate change policies. American evangelicals are opposed to international climate policy in particular due to their distrust of international cooperation and institutions, which has been a prominent feature of evangelical politics since the beginning of the Cold War.

There are two elements to this aversion. First, many evangelicals have a particularly emphatic, sacralized view of American exceptionalism, and they reject compromises with secular and socialist foreign powers that would endanger the divine covenant on which the United States was built (Lieven, 2004). Second, many evangelicals see international institutions as stepping stones to a single world government, which some associate with the rule of the Antichrist as specified by biblical prophesy. Together, these factors create a formidable suspicion of any climate cooperation regime that might interfere with the sovereignty of the United States. This suspicion may be harder to dislodge than anti-environmentalism, which if anything seems to be declining among evangelicals (Smith and Johnson, 2010). To be sure, not every evangelical holds these beliefs and evangelicals may differ in the degree to which they espouse these views. Some individuals may follow the cues of evangelical elites who hold these beliefs, without necessarily holding those beliefs themselves. We only argue that evangelical identification makes an individual more likely to oppose international climate change policies than domestic ones.

We test this explanation using data from the 2011 “Faith and Global Policy Challenges” (FGPC) survey. This survey sampled 1,496 Americans that are representative of the national population across standard covariates like race and education. The unique advantage of this survey is that, in addition to a variety of useful covariates, it contains a wide range of questions on religiosity and attitudes toward climate policy both at the domestic *and* international level. Given the content of the survey, we were able to compare the relationship between religiosity and climate policies at the international and domestic levels. To our understanding, no other study of public opinion has done this.

We find considerable support for the theory that evangelical opposition to action on climate

¹See <http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations>. Accessed October 29, 2012.

change is driven primarily by aversion to international cooperation. There is relatively little difference, controlling for other factors, between evangelicals and non-evangelical respondents on the question of whether the United States should take action to address climate change domestically. However, being an evangelical has a significant and substantively important negative effect on support for the use of international binding agreements to deal with climate change. This phenomenon is distinctly linked to being evangelical. We do not find a similar effect for other groups of Christians. Furthermore, this effect appears to be independent of the high levels of political conservatism found among American evangelicals. Conservatism has a strong effect on opposition to both domestic and international efforts to abate climate change, but the evangelical aversion to international climate agreements is present even controlling for respondent ideology. We also find the same results using controls for unobserved geographic heterogeneity and in alternate specifications of the models.

These findings can inform future studies on the relationship between religion and climate policy. For one, the findings testify to the difference between evangelical and mainline Protestants. While mainline Protestants do not seem to significantly differ from non-religious respondents and Catholics, evangelicals stand out as having a more negative view of climate cooperation. Moreover, the roots of evangelical opposition to climate policy are found in the historical fears of international cooperation that have shaped the positions of evangelical leaders at least since the onset of the Cold War. While American evangelicals are only slightly less supportive of domestic climate policy than other Americans, international efforts are a red flag for them.

Our study is also among the first to analyze the relationship between religion and international cooperation. It is well-established in international relations research that the preferences of domestic actors affect the prospects for cooperation at the international level as well as the terms of international agreements (Frieden, 1999; Milner, 1997). While religious leaders have historically often emphasized global unity and ecumenical collaboration, members of American evangelical congregations hold a hostile view of international cooperation. In previous studies of American public opinion on international cooperation, the religious dimension has been frequently neglected.

If the advocates of climate policy are to build support for their initiatives among evangelicals, they should downplay the role of treaties and agreements in their campaigning. In the United States, evangelicals are not so much opposed to climate policy as they are opposed to international cooperative efforts. From the evangelical perspective, the road to global action must begin with national efforts that respect American independence and sovereignty. While this does not mean that domestic policy without cooperation is sufficient or that other constituencies in the United States do not support cooperation, strategic communication to the evangelical community should emphasize domestic, not international, action.

2 Evangelicals, Climate Change, and International Cooperation

Religion is important for climate policy and other public issues because it exerts a powerful influence on peoples' world views. Religious beliefs, principles, and rules form the moral basis of a believer's approach to policy (Froese and Bader, 2010). Policies that are inconsistent with a person's deeply held religious beliefs are more likely to be rejected, while policies that accord with a believer's religious system of thought are more readily accepted. In the United States there are notable religious divides on political issues with moral dimensions (Putnam and Campbell, 2012; Haidt, 2012), and religion has often been a critical resource in political mobilization (Zald and McCarthy, 1998).

We focus specifically on evangelical Christians. By evangelicals, we mean Protestants who emphasize personal acceptance of Jesus Christ as their lord and savior and who usually believe that the Bible is the literal word of God (Rothenberg and Newport, 1984: Ch. 2). Evangelicals are generally theologically and morally conservative, resisting the “modernization” and accommodation with secular culture that characterizes “mainline” Protestantism. Though they are not technically identical, the term “evangelical” is often used interchangeably with “fundamentalist,” “born again Christian” or “conservative Protestant” without any serious loss of meaning. While many large and small denominations can be classified as evangelical (e.g. Southern Baptists, Pentecostals, Missouri Synod Lutherans), there are also individuals within other Protestant denominations who may identify as evangelicals.

We concentrate on evangelicals for a number of reasons. First, they are a very large group, larger than any other broad religious classification in the United States (i.e. mainline Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox Christians, Jews etc.). Because of their numbers, they have had a major impact on American politics, especially on issues such as abortion rights and same sex marriage. As scholarship on the so-called “culture wars” has shown, evangelicals have been a particularly potent force when combined with other religious conservatives (Putnam and Campbell, 2012).

Second, for around forty years, evangelicals have frequently mobilized around religious issues. As Shields (2009) has argued, this mobilization has changed the face of American democracy. Prior to the advent of the “Christian right” in the late 1960s, evangelicals were a politically alienated constituency. The re-emergence of issues such as prayer in schools and abortion brought evangelical activists and voters back into American politics after a four-decade retreat following the humiliation of the Scopes “monkey trial” in 1925. Third, a large body of scholarship, discussed below, has been concerned with the differences between evangelicals and other Americans on environmental issues. It is widely accepted that there are relatively few differences between other denominations or religions on environmental issues, as most have embraced some form of environmental consciousness.

We limit the scope of this study to the United States, and the mechanisms we propose for religious opposition to climate policy are firmly situated in an American political and cultural context. There are tens of millions of evangelical Christians outside the United States, but we would not expect them to hold the same opinions. While evangelical opposition, as we will argue, is at least partly grounded in theological concerns, those concerns are intertwined with a distinctive “political theology” (Philpott, 2007) about the role of the United States as a Godly and exemplary nation. This political theology is simply not portable, for the most part, to evangelicals outside the United States. In any case, we would generally expect non-Americans to think about America’s role in climate policy in different ways from Americans.

In analyzing the relationship between evangelicalism and climate policy, we distinguish between *domestic* and *international* aspects of the problem. We shall argue that evangelical beliefs have different effects on preferences regarding domestic versus international climate change policies. Evangelical beliefs need not contradict the premises of domestic climate policy, but there is tension between modern American Evangelical thought and international cooperation on climate policy.

2.1 Domestic Climate Policy

We do not expect evangelicalism to have a negative effect on people’s views of domestic climate policy, holding all other factors equal. Neither evangelical doctrine nor recent practice offers a

clear case against climate policy.² Instead, the evangelical movement contains a variety of views on the issue, with no clear winner.

Scholars often have seen evangelical Protestantism, especially in its fundamentalist varieties, as a repository of “dominion” theology that emphasizes human mastery over nature.³ In 1967 Lynn White famously argued that the biblical narrative of creation in Judeo-Christianity is at the heart of the ecological crisis, because in this account “no item in physical creation had any purpose save to serve man’s purposes” (White, 1967). Most subsequent research has found that neither dominion theology nor aversion to environmentalism are prevalent throughout Judeo-Christianity, but they tend to be concentrated in more theologically conservative Protestant denominations (Eckberg and Blocker, 1989, 1996; Guth et al., 1993, 1995; Tarakeshwar et al., 2001). Dominion theology in conservative denominations does not always appear in the form of outward hostility toward the environment or environmentalism. Instead, in comparison to the embrace of environmental issues by other Christian groups, “fundamentalist churches seldom address the issue, or, if they do, express skepticism about religious environmentalism” (Guth et al., 1993: 373). Wolkomir et al. (1997) argue that dominion theology has little actual effect on environmental attitudes.

More recently, various researchers have identified a strong theological counter-narrative of environmental “stewardship” in both evangelical discourse and Christian thinking more generally (Sherkat and Ellison, 2007; Wardekker, Petersen, and van der Sluijs, 2009; Prelli and Winters, 2009; Dowland and Gasaway, 2010; Wilkinson, 2012). This viewpoint emphasizes God’s ownership of the earth, and the human responsibility to take care of it.⁴ Even conservative evangelical denominations who have often been suspicious of political environmentalism have issued statements in support of the stewardship idea and calling for a halt to environmental degradation. (Sherkat and Ellison, 2007).

Some have argued that where evangelical opposition to climate action or environmentalism exists, it has little to do with theology and everything to do with politics. Sherkat and Ellison (2007) find that political conservatism is the main factor driving a relationship between literal belief in the Bible and opposition to environmental activism. Wilkinson (2012), who identifies climate care as the core issue of the emerging “evangelical center” in politics, writes that opposition from the evangelical right reflects much broader debates in evangelical circles about “the appropriate role of government, the profits and perils of political alliances, and religion’s proper ethical orientation and place in the public sphere.” It is likely that evangelicals would be more supportive of environmental efforts led by religious organizations rather than government agencies, reflecting a general preference for religious rather than governmental collective action in response to social problems (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006)

Another possibility is that, because of a prevailing belief that we are “living in the end times,” evangelicals see little point to devoting resources to solving problems in the distant future. Barker and Bearce (2012) argue that Christians with such “end times” beliefs have shorter sociotropic time horizons, making them less likely to support potentially costly action to save the environment. The authors find that respondents who believe that “Jesus will return to earth

²See, for example, Skotece (2012) on progressive Christian organizations and climate change.

³The dominion view is derived from the book of Genesis 1:28. “God blessed them and said to them, ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.’”

⁴One of the key Bible passages in stewardship theology is Psalms 24:1. “The earth is the Lord’s, and everything in it, the world, and all who live in it.”

some day,” (approximately 56% of those surveyed) were significantly less likely to agree with a statement indicating “Global warming is a problem that requires immediate government action...” (Barker and Bearce, 2012). This study is complementary to Barker and Bearce, in that we seek to isolate the effects of religious beliefs on particular types of climate change policy.

2.2 International Cooperation

The American evangelical movement’s core beliefs lay the foundation for a clearly negative view of international cooperation on climate policy. The American evangelical movement’s historical opposition to international organizations applies to climate agreements, and so evangelicals can be expected to oppose global efforts to mitigate climate change, especially as they interfere with American sovereignty.

Since the beginning of the Second World War there has been a visible religious divide on the question of American involvement in international organizations. Preston (2012) notes that by 1945 most religious leaders, including some evangelicals, were “internationalists” and supporters of the United Nations, but there was strong and vocal opposition to the UN by Protestant fundamentalists and evangelical conservatives. These Christians feared that “the construction of a global regulatory state” would “herald the birth of a new world order,” and premillennialists believed the UN would fulfil biblical prophesy, paving the way for the Antichrist as world dictator. Alongside this eschatological concern there were more concrete political objections that the United Nations would become a quasi-world government that would interfere with the American way of life, imposing foreign secularism and socialism (Preston, 2012: 402-3). The fact that Catholics and liberal Protestants supported international institutions was, especially for Southern evangelicals, further evidence that these institutions were a plot “to destroy America’s Christian foundations” (Dochuk, 2010: 105).

In general, evangelical Protestant denominations became more conservative from the 1960s onwards. In the 1950s there had been a powerful liberal strain within evangelicalism, exemplified by Billy Graham, but by the 1960s conservative politics and hard-line theology had come to dominate evangelical Protestantism, relegating liberals to the margins of the movement (Shires, 2007: Ch. 7). In the 1940s and 1950s all major religious denominations had adopted a strong anti-communist stance, but by the 1960s evangelicals suspected that other Christians were abandoning anti-communism internationally and accepting a shrinking role for religion in domestic public life. Evangelicals came to see the global anti-communist crusade as their particular religious responsibility (Herzog, 2011). This period also saw the beginning of a shift by evangelical voters to the increasingly right-wing Republican party, further intensifying their distrust of international institutions and cooperation.

Rock (2011) describes a mix of politics and eschatology that continues to underpin evangelical objections to international institutions. Hal Lindsey, author of the immensely influential *The Late, Great Planet Earth* reiterated in 2005 that the United Nations would ultimately be replaced by a world government headed by the Antichrist. This idea is echoed in Tim LaHaye’s widely read *Left Behind* novels and in the sermons of Jerry Falwell. Not all evangelicals believe that the “end times” are imminent, but even those who do not tend to be wary of prioritizing international cooperation. This position, exemplified by one-time Republican Presidential candidate Pat Robertson, is that international cooperation is simply futile because of the greedy and belligerent nature of human beings in a fallen world. Peace will only be achieved when Satan’s final

rebellion is crushed and Christ's reign begins on earth (Rock, 2011: 142-3 and 145-9).⁵

The National Association of Evangelicals and the Southern Baptist Convention have both complained that the United Nations and globalism in general are vehicles for the "New Age Movement," a dangerous amalgam of pseudo-religious spirituality that will act as a secular replacement for Judeo-Christian faith. The New Age Movement, according to evangelical leaders, promotes the destruction of national sovereignty and the traditional family, and promotes wholesale abortion as a means of population control (Rock, 2011: 143-4). One of the most successful evangelical campaigns against international institutions has been the continuing effort to persuade Congress and the president to withhold funding from international organizations that they claim promote abortion and contraception, including the UN, IMF and World Bank (Martin, 1999). During Republican administrations, this has given rise to the Mexico City Policy (known to opponents as the "global gag rule") which requires any NGO receiving USAID funding to "neither perform nor actively promote abortion as a method of family planning in other nations."

One area in which evangelical Protestants have been notably "internationalist" in recent decades is the issue of international religious freedom. In the 1970s, evangelical activists joined Jewish and Catholic activists in calling for an end to Cold War detente because of the Soviet Union's refusal to allow religious dissidents to leave its borders (Preston, 2012). Religious freedom has remained the overriding international human rights issue for evangelicals, and evangelical activists played a key role in the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act through Congress in 1998 (Farr, 2008). The religious freedom agenda in the 1970s helped fuel broader human rights discourse in the United States, and evangelical organizations have since expanded their concerns to other areas such as eliminating human trafficking (Weitzer, 2007). However, even this internationally-minded activism retains something of a nationalist flavor. Critics of the International Religious Freedom Act, which requires US embassies to monitor religious freedom in their host countries and produce annual reports on perceived abuses, argue it imposes a distinctly "separationist" and privatistic American conception of religious freedom on countries where configurations of church and state are very different (Smith, 2012).

In summary, a constellation of political and religious factors has fed into an historic distrust of international institutions and international cooperation among conservative Protestants in the United States. Any explanation of the effect of religion on attitudes towards climate change and its solutions must take into account this group's general aversion towards international efforts that seem to compromise American sovereignty and promote a "secular humanist" or "New Age" agenda.

Hypothesis 1 (Evangelicals and international climate cooperation). *All else equal, being evangelicals has a stronger, negative effect on support for international climate change policies than for domestic policies.*

3 Research Design

To analyze the opinions of evangelicals on climate policy, we examine the results of the "Faith and Global Policy Challenges" (FGPC) survey, conducted in December of 2011 jointly by the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies and Program on International Policy Attitudes.⁶ The survey was fielded by Knowledge Networks, which recruits respondents

⁵See also: Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson (2008) who find that belief in the inerrancy of the Bible is associated with greater preference for militarism in the United States.

⁶See Kull et al. (2011) for their report.

for online surveys. The FGPC surveyed 1,496 American adults and the sample was chosen to be nationally representative across a wide range of standard covariates. The FGPC also included a large number of Evangelical respondents.

The survey was designed to describe differences in opinions between respondents who did and did not hold particular beliefs on pressing global issues. The survey instrument first elicited whether the respondent believed in God and/or whether the respondent felt that there were “spiritual obligations to act in certain ways.” It then asked questions about the respondent’s opinions on issues like climate change, nuclear proliferation, and species loss. Additionally, the survey asked respondents to describe their religion. Respondents who chose one of the Christian denominations were then asked if they considered themselves to be “born-again or evangelical.” Lastly, respondents answered a series of standard demographic questions.

3.1 Dependent Variables

We are interested most in responses to two questions about climate change, one pertaining to domestic costs of abatement efforts and one pertaining to international climate change cooperation. The “domestic” question asked “Which comes closer to your opinion: (a) Efforts in the United States to reduce the release of greenhouse gasses will cost too much money and hurt the U.S. economy or (b) The U.S. economy will be more competitive because these efforts will result in more efficient energy use, saving money in the long run?” We call this the domestic question because the key content pertains to domestic costs and benefits of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement and specifically keys the respondent towards considering “efforts in the United States.” *Domestic* is coded 1 if the respondent chose option (b) and 0 otherwise.

The “international” question, on the other hand, focused directly on *how* GHG reductions would be pursued. It keyed respondents to focus on international treaties by stating “As you may know there is some discussion about whether or not it is a good idea for nations to work together to establish legally binding agreements, such as treaties, to address certain international problems.” Respondents then selected whether they considered it a “good idea” or “not a good idea” to use binding international agreements to address GHG reductions. Note that the question focuses on legally binding agreements, which is appropriate because climate cooperation requires that countries reduce emissions more than is in their individual interest.⁷

The international question came well after the domestic question on the survey instrument. The key content of the international question was its explicit focus on international efforts to reduce GHG emissions. Respondents likely had some latent opinion on whether the benefits of GHG reductions outweighed the costs (as elicited in the domestic question), but the international question forced them to focus on whether cooperation with other nations on GHG reductions was a good idea, in particular. While the two questions were worded somewhat differently, the strong domestic-international difference allows us to test our hypothesis concerning the role of evangelicalism in the formation of climate public opinion.

International is coded 1 if the respondent indicated that international agreements were a good idea and 0 otherwise. Overall, 73% of respondents supported domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gasses and 80% supported international efforts.

⁷For both the domestic and international questions, respondents could also select “Don’t Know” or refuse to answer. We exclude these respondents from our analysis.

3.2 Explanatory Variables

Our main explanatory variables describe the religious beliefs of the respondent. The survey instrument asked respondents to identify their religion from a list of common religions and particular denominations. *Christian* is a dummy variable coded 1 for those who identified themselves as Baptist, Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, Eastern Orthodox, or Other Christian, and 0 otherwise.

Those who selected one of the options corresponding to a denomination of Christianity were then asked whether they described themselves as a “born-again or evangelical Christian.” *Evangelical* is a dummy variable coded 1 for the subset of Christians who answered yes to this question and 0 otherwise. There are 1,255 self-identified Christians in the sample. Of those, 437 (35%) also described themselves as born-again or Evangelical. The remaining 818 (65%) are non-Evangelical Christians.

We also examine a number of additional explanatory variables. *Conservative* measures respondents’ political views on a 5-point scale, ranging from “Very liberal” (1) to “Very conservative” (5). We also included the respondent’s age in years, employment status, race, income bracket, and marital status.⁸ Table 1 shows the summary statistics for each variable.

[Table 1 about here.]

Table 2 shows the percent of respondents who expressed support for each type of carbon reduction policies, broken down by religious beliefs. According to these descriptive statistics, evangelicals are less supportive of both domestic and international action. However, this simple comparison fails to account for confounding variables, such as political ideology. Another interesting observation is that international cooperation generally draws more support than domestic action; this could reflect differences in the wording of the question and/or people’s preference for reciprocal cooperation on a global issue.

[Table 2 about here.]

Table 3 shows the pairwise correlation matrix for the two dependent variables (*Domestic* and *International*), three main explanatory variables (*Conservative*, *Christian*, and *Evangelical*) as well as the other control variables. Below each correlation coefficient is the *p*-value accompanying a *t*-test of the hypothesis that the correlation coefficient equals zero.

The correlation coefficient between responses to the *Domestic* and *International* questions is only 0.51. This suggests that there is in fact important divergence in respondents’ attitudes regarding these questions. Not every respondent who supports climate change policies supports *international* climate change policies, and vice versa. As expected, being Christian and being Evangelical are strongly and significantly correlated with being conservative. Part of the benefit of our analysis is that it helps us distinguish between the effects of being Christian or Evangelical on respondents’ opinions from the fact that Christians and Evangelicals also tend to be more conservative. A cross-tabulation of religious and political beliefs can be found in the supplementary appendix.

[Table 3 about here.]

⁸Income bracket was measured on a 19 point scale, with different household incomes. We use the race variable to code a binary indicator for white/Caucasian respondents, *White*. *Married*, *Male*, and *Employed* are binary indicators for whether the respondent was married, male, or employed, respectively.

3.3 Statistical Model

Using a probit model, we regressed the *Domestic* and *International* variables on our measures of religion and ideology, as well as other control variables. For each specification, we regressed each dependent variable on four combinations of the explanatory variables: (1) ideology alone, (2) ideology and the Christianity dummy, (3) ideology and the Evangelical dummy, and (4) ideology and the dummy variables for Evangelicals and non-Evangelical Christians. The goal was to analyze how each of the three explanatory variables affected respondents' support for domestic and international actions to mitigate climate change. The different combinations of dummy variables allow us to compare evangelicals with all other respondents, as well as compare them with Christians who are not evangelical. The sequence of models highlights how ideology has a consistent effect on respondent's views regarding domestic and international climate change efforts, but being evangelical has an effect, in particular, on international efforts. And the effect of being evangelical is distinct from simply being Christian.

4 Results

The results from the first set of estimations are shown in Table 4. First, we find results that are consistent with existing arguments about preferences over climate change policy. Looking at the first row, more conservative respondents are more opposed to both domestic and international abatement efforts. Unsurprisingly, a respondent's conservative ideology is a consistent, strong and significant predictor of their opposition to any type of climate change efforts. Being Christian *does not* increase opposition to either domestic or international abatement efforts. From model 2, being Christian is associated with weakly higher support for domestic climate efforts, relative to non-Christians, though this effect was not statistically significant. From model 6, being Christian was associated with weakly lower support for international efforts, though this result, too, is statistically insignificant.

Second, and more importantly for the arguments in this paper, we find strong support for the hypothesis described above. The effect of being evangelical is much more pronounced for opposition to international abatement efforts than for opposition to domestic efforts. Looking at models 7 and 8, being evangelical is associated with respondents being particularly opposed to international abatement efforts in ways that are distinct from their political ideology or the fact that they are Christian.

[Table 4 about here.]

The effect of being evangelical on support for international policies is stronger, both substantively and statistically than the analogous effect on domestic policy, as in models 3 and 4. In models 4 and 8, with non-Evangelical Christians being separated from non-religious respondents, the coefficient for being Evangelical is negative. However, the coefficient is very close to zero and not near statistically significant in model 4, which predicts support for domestic action. In model 8, which focuses on support for international action, being Evangelical continues to have a negative coefficient, though the p value is slightly higher than conventional levels of significance ($p = 0.115$).

The substantive effect of being evangelical on opposition to international climate efforts is large, and much larger than the effect on domestic climate efforts.⁹ One way to think about

⁹Looking at the substantive effects is particularly important, because we can't directly compare coefficients across models with two different dependent variables.

comparing substantive effects is to consider the effect of being evangelical, relative to changes in political ideology. Looking at the coefficients from model 7, being evangelical results in a similar decrease in support for international efforts to combat climate change as moving approximately 0.7 points on the 5-point Conservative ideology scale. In model 8, even when breaking respondents into evangelical and non-evangelical Christians, being evangelical has the same effect on support for international abatement as moving 0.5 points on the Conservative ideology scale. In other words, common wisdom correctly holds that being more Conservative is associated with greater disapproval of international efforts to combat climate change. These results show that being Evangelical also has an effect of similar magnitude as significant movements along the Conservative ideology scale.

Table 5 shows the predicted probabilities of supporting each type of abatement policy, using the results from Table 4, models 4 and 8, which distinguished between evangelical and non-evangelical Christians. The top set of probabilities is for international efforts, and the bottom set is for domestic efforts. Looking at the top set, across each interval on the ideological spectrum, evangelicals are less supportive of international abatement efforts than both their non-evangelical and non-Christian counterparts. At moderate levels of conservativeness, evangelicals are approximately 12% less likely to support international abatement efforts than their non-Christian counterparts. Even at the highest level of conservativeness, being evangelical is associated with an additional 9% decrease in support for international policies, relative to non-Christians, and an 11% decrease relative to non-evangelical Christians.

The predicted probability of support for international reductions for non-evangelical Christians is similar to non-Christians across each particular political ideology. Non-Evangelical Christians are actually slightly more supportive of international reductions than non-Christians with similar political ideologies. However, being evangelical still has a significant negative effect on the probability of support international reductions. Averaged across each of the political ideologies, being evangelical is associated with approximately a 6% decrease in the probability of supporting international reduction efforts. Looking at the bottom set of probabilities, evangelicals are virtually indistinguishable from their non-Christian counterparts, across the ideological spectrum. To further support the contention that being evangelical has a distinct effect on preferences for international policies, the bottom of Table 5 shows the effect of being evangelical on preferences for domestic policies. Across the political ideology spectrum, the predicted preferences of evangelicals for domestic policies are virtually indistinguishable from the predicted preferences of non-Christian respondents. Interestingly, the only difference appears when comparing non-evangelical Christians with evangelicals and non-Christians. Non-evangelical Christians have higher levels of predicted support for domestic policies than both their evangelical and non-Christian counterparts.

In summary, the importance of being evangelical is more pronounced for predicting support for international than for domestic action. This is consistent with our theory: evangelical beliefs produce a negative attitude toward international cooperation in particular.

[Table 5 about here.]

4.1 Robustness and Additional Tests

In addition to the models described in Table 4, we conducted checks to ensure that these results were robust to a variety of specifications. The survey also coded respondents' location, grouping them into 9 geographic regions, e.g. "New England." We also checked that our results were

robust to unobserved regional heterogeneity by re-estimating the above models including region fixed effects. Table 6 replicates this same set of models with region fixed effects included.¹⁰ Across the models, the coefficients for variables of interest are similar. Most importantly, the negative coefficient of being evangelical in models predicting support for international action remains more strongly negative and statistically significant than the effect of being evangelical on domestic policy.

[Table 6 about here.]

For one robustness check, we examined whether the effects of conservative ideology and being evangelical were moderated by the respondent's media consumption. The survey asked respondents how many times they watched Fox News per week, which translated to a five point scale ranging from "Never" to "About once per week" to "Almost every day." Respondents were fairly evenly distributed along this five point scale, with 23% indicating that they watched Fox News almost every day and 23% indicating that they never watch Fox News. The variable *Fox* codes respondent's answers on this five point scale.

Media consumption is an important source of information and can influence viewers' political opinions (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010; Bartels, 1993; Morris, 2007). Connolly (2005) has argued that Fox News serves to "fold, bend, blend, emulsify and dissolve into each other" the various disparate elements of American conservatism, such as corporate interests and evangelical beliefs. According to Connolly this creates an "evangelical-capitalist resonance machine" that mutually reinforces both elements. From this perspective, evangelical aversion to climate action could be heightened by media cues that are politically conservative without being overtly religious. This would present a challenge to our theory that there is a distinctive evangelical aversion to climate action motivated by religious concerns. To examine whether watching Fox News reinforced conservative or evangelical views on climate change policy, we interacted the conservative variable and the evangelical dummy with the Fox News variable and re-estimated models 1 and 3 and 5 and 7, from Table 4.

The results are displayed in Table 7. For conservatives, watching Fox News unsurprisingly increases opposition to both domestic and international climate policy. But what about evangelicals? Among people who do not watch Fox News, being evangelical is associated with increased opposition to international climate efforts, but its effect on domestic efforts is statistically insignificant. The interaction term itself is negative, small, and statistically insignificant, meaning that the importance of being evangelical for opposing international action is at best slightly smaller among Fox News watchers. This null result is consistent with our arguments above. Despite the popularity of Fox News with evangelicals, its discourse on climate change has little specific resonance with them. Fox News reflects a much more secular, business-oriented indifference towards the environment, emphasizing supposed scientific disagreement on the existence and causes of climate change (Feldman et al., 2012). Fox does not venture into the eschatological meanings of international climate cooperation. This null result adds further support to our argument that other channels of conservative hostility to climate action are insufficient to explain the specific attitudes of evangelicals.

¹⁰The data are not rich enough to accommodate more demanding fixed effects strategies, i.e. state fixed effects or regressions with evangelical Christians and non-evangelical Christians. The number of respondents per region ranges from 81 to 279, so dividing respondents into further subcategories would make inference difficult. These estimates are from fixed effects logit regressions, using STATA 12.

[Table 7 about here.]

We also examined whether other potentially salient religious distinctions affected respondents' opinions on climate change efforts. Specifically, we re-estimated the models above including a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent identified themselves as Catholic.¹¹ The results are presented in Table 8. The above results again obtain. Evangelicals are opposed to international climate efforts, and not significantly opposed to domestic efforts. Looking at the coefficients on the *Catholic* dummy, Catholic respondents were generally more supportive of both domestic and international climate change efforts, though these results are often statistically insignificant. This suggests, in line with much of the previous literature about religion and the environment, that the only true religious divide over environmental policy is between evangelical Protestants and others. There is little difference worth mentioning between Catholics and Mainline Protestants, or between either of these groups and people of no religion.

[Table 8 about here.]

We also examined whether being evangelical increases the respondents' skepticism of climate science. The survey asked respondents if they thought that the scientists of the world (1) "think the problem is urgent enough and is known enough to take action" (2) "think the problem is not urgent enough, and not enough is yet known to take action" or (3) "views are pretty evenly divided". To measure the respondent's level of climate science skepticism, we coded a binary variable, *Skeptic* which equals one if the respondent chose option 2 and zero otherwise.

We then re-estimated the model specifications above using climate skepticism as the dependent variable. The results are in Table 9. The results suggest that although evangelicals do not oppose domestic climate action, they are on average less convinced about the scientific foundations of anthropogenic global warming than other Americans.

[Table 9 about here.]

The supplementary appendix contains further tests and robustness checks. First, we replicated our results using two different types of survey weights, one designed to down-weight the oversampling of Catholics and evangelicals in the original survey and another designed to make the sample more reflective of the general population in terms of religious variables and other covariates. Using both weights, the original results obtain. Second, we included skepticism as an independent variable. Unsurprisingly, skepticism was associated with less support for domestic and international climate change efforts. The original findings obtain as well, though they are weaker when splitting Christians into evangelical and non-evangelical categories. Third, we interacted church attendance with being evangelical, similar to our Fox News interactions, finding that active church attendance does not strengthen the effect of being evangelical.

5 Conclusion

Although the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was signed in 1992, the following two decades have seen little progress toward a global climate treaty. One possible explanation for the negotiation gridlock is the intransigent position of the United States. If this

¹¹Note that some respondents, 34, identified themselves as both Catholic and evangelical. Since this is such a small number, for the regression below, we simply include both dummy variables rather than distinguish between Catholic and non-Catholic evangelicals.

explanation holds, the fate of the global climate negotiations could to a large extent depend on domestic politics in the United States. Without a major change in American domestic politics, it is hard to imagine that other major emitters like China and Russia would agree on deep emissions reductions. In the unlikely event of a legally binding treaty without the United States, American emissions would continue to contribute to climate change.

Given the considerable political clout of religious groups in the United States, we have sought to shed light on the religious politics of climate policy in the country. Specifically, we used a national survey from 2011 to examine how evangelicals, whose numbers add up to approximately one-fourth of the national population, approach climate policy. Since the beginning of the Cold War, evangelicals have been profoundly distrusting of international cooperation. We have shown that being evangelical is associated with particularly severe opposition to international climate policy, compared to domestic policy.

Since climate change is a global issue that ultimately requires cooperation (Barrett and Toman, 2010), the finding has important strategic implications for climate policy advocates. Even if the United States manages to implement increasingly ambitious domestic climate policies in the future, this is no guarantee of a global treaty. Given that Senate ratifies international treaties by a supermajority of two-thirds, evangelical opposition to climate cooperation may well form an impediment to a global climate treaty, even if other pieces of the puzzle somehow fall in place. While some evangelical groups have begun to emphasize even international climate change efforts,¹² they seem to be a minority among the broader evangelical community.

The findings have implications for the sources of possible change in American politics. If climate policy advocates are to increase abatement levels in federal and state policy, the evangelical vote is more likely to be forthcoming if the focus of campaigning is on domestic, instead of international, action. Although climate policy requires a global solution in the long run, the United States is such a large emitter and technological powerhouse that even domestic action could pave the way forward. In pursuing this solution, of course, it would be important to specifically target advocacy focused on domestic action to constituencies who are opposed to international cooperation, such as evangelicals. For other, more internationalist groups, emphasizing the role of the United States in international cooperation may be more effective. Indeed, it could be dangerous to emphasize domestic policy too much, given that a global solution is ultimately required. Our findings suggest that climate policies can be sold more effectively to evangelicals by focusing on the domestic aspects, but at the same time other constituencies in the United States and elsewhere may support international efforts in particular.

Ours is one of the first quantitative studies on the relationship between religion and international cooperation on climate change. As such, it leaves open at least as many questions as it answers. For one, our survey evidence is limited to the United States. Religion may play a rather different role in other countries. Similarly, we have not commented on the role of other religious affiliations, such as Islam or Hinduism. Perhaps most importantly, our study has not examined whether the beliefs of evangelicals actually shape their voting or economic behavior. Our findings certainly highlight the importance of studies that focus on the behavioral and political consequences of religious thought.

From a broader perspective, probably the most important contribution of our study is to begin bridging the gap between the study of international cooperation and religion. There has not been

¹²See, for example: Konkol, Brian E. "Climate Change, Poverty, Distractions, and Denial." Sojourners Online, <http://sojo.net/blogs/2012/09/14/climate-change-poverty-distractions-and-denial>.

much disagreement on the importance of international cooperation under conditions of complex interdependence for decades (Keohane and Nye, 1977), and religion is widely recognized as an important element of the American society (Froese and Bader, 2010). However, the relationship between specific international issues and religious thought is rarely studied. We have shown that religion shapes public opinion on international cooperation in non-obvious ways. This finding provides a rationale for future studies on the role of religion international cooperation, and relations between countries more generally.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Main Explanatory Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Conservative	3.308	0.927	1472
Christian	0.839	0.368	1496
Non-evan. Chr.	0.547	0.498	1496
Evangelical	0.292	0.455	1496
Employed	0.545	0.498	1496
Age	50.273	16.96	1496
White	0.761	0.426	1496
Male	0.5	0.5	1496
Income	11.963	4.315	1496
Married	0.602	0.49	1496

Summary statistics for all respondents who answered both questions. Sample size changes slightly for regressions since fewer respondents answered “Don’t Know” (or refused to answer) for the international question.

Table 2: Percent Support for Domestic and International Reduction, by Religious Beliefs

	N	Domestic	International
Full Sample	1434	72.8%	79.6%
Non-Christians	233	79.4%	85.8%
Christians	1201	71.5%	78.4%
Evangelicals	408	64.0%	70.3%
Non-evangelicals	793	75.4%	82.5%

Percent of respondents supporting domestic and international carbon reduction efforts.

Table 3: Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Explanatory Variables

Variables	Domestic	International	Conservative	Christian	Evangelical	Employed	Age	White	Male	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Domestic	1.00									
International	0.51 (< 0.01)	1.00								
Conservative	-0.33 (< 0.01)	-0.26 (< 0.01)	1.00							
Christian	-0.07 (0.01)	-0.07 (0.01)	0.27 (< 0.01)	1.00						
Evangelical	-0.13 (< 0.01)	-0.14 (< 0.01)	0.22 (< 0.01)	0.28 (< 0.01)	1.00					
Employed	0.06 (0.02)	0.04 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.19)	-0.08 (< 0.01)	1.00				
Age	-0.10 (< 0.01)	-0.07 (0.01)	0.11 (< 0.01)	0.13 (< 0.01)	0.05 (0.07)	-0.36 (< 0.01)	1.00			
White	-0.06 (0.02)	0.002 (0.95)	0.09 (< 0.01)	0.01 (0.70)	-0.05 (0.04)	< 0.01 (0.95)	0.15 (< 0.01)	1.00		
Male	-0.08 (< 0.01)	-0.06 (0.03)	0.07 (0.01)	-0.03 (0.23)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.25)	1.00	
Income	-0.01 (0.73)	-0.03 (0.26)	-0.004 (0.88)	-0.02 (0.36)	-0.12 (< 0.01)	0.27 (< 0.01)	-0.0008 (0.98)	0.14 (< 0.01)	0.07 (0.01)	1.00
Married	-0.10 (< 0.01)	-0.10 (< 0.01)	0.16 (< 0.01)	0.08 (< 0.01)	0.08 (< 0.01)	0.04 (0.16)	0.21 (< 0.01)	0.11 (< 0.01)	0.07 (0.01)	0.33 (< 0.01)

p -values from t -test that the correlation coefficient equals zero are in parentheses below correlation coefficients.

Table 4: Effect of Liberal, Christian, Evangelical on Support for GHG Reduction

	Domestic				International			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conservative	-.518 (.045)***	-.529 (.046)***	-.500 (.046)***	-.513 (.047)***	-.419 (.046)***	-.417 (.047)***	-.392 (.047)***	-.396 (.048)***
Christian		.105 (.111)				-.026 (.118)		
NonevChr				.160 (.114)				.065 (.122)
Evangelical			-.154 (.084)*	-.023 (.125)			-.267 (.085)***	-.213 (.131) [†]
Employed	.093 (.084)	.090 (.084)	.088 (.084)	.083 (.084)	.044 (.088)	.045 (.088)	.036 (.088)	.034 (.088)
Age	-.003 (.002)	-.004 (.002)	-.003 (.002)	-.004 (.002)	-.004 (.003)	-.004 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.004 (.003)
White	-.075 (.091)	-.075 (.091)	-.084 (.091)	-.084 (.091)	.158 (.093)*	.158 (.093)*	.144 (.094)	.142 (.094)
Male	-.167 (.076)**	-.162 (.076)**	-.176 (.076)**	-.170 (.076)**	-.099 (.079)	-.100 (.079)	-.114 (.079)	-.112 (.079)
Income	.0003 (.010)	.0004 (.010)	-.002 (.010)	-.002 (.010)	-.007 (.010)	-.007 (.010)	-.011 (.010)	-.011 (.010)
Married	-.116 (.085)	-.117 (.085)	-.100 (.085)	-.098 (.085)	-.168 (.089)*	-.167 (.089)*	-.142 (.089)	-.142 (.089)
N	1434	1434	1434	1434	1456	1456	1456	1456

Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. [†]: p -value = 0.104. *, **, and *** represent p -values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. “Domestic” indicates regression uses the survey question on domestic reductions as the dependent variable. “International” indicates the question on international reductions.

Table 5: Predicted Support for International and Domestic Reduction, Non-Christians, Non-Ev. Christians, and Evangelicals

		Respondent's Conservativeness				
		1	2	3	4	5
Non-Christian	Pr(Int. = 1)	0.96 (0.93,0.98)	0.94 (0.87,0.95)	0.84 (0.77,0.89)	0.72 (0.63,0.80)	0.58 (0.46,0.69)
Non-Ev. Christian	Pr(Int. = 1)	0.97 (0.94,0.98)	0.93 (0.89,0.95)	0.85 (0.81,0.89)	0.74 (0.69,0.80)	0.60 (0.53,0.68)
Evangelical	Pr(Int. = 1)	0.94 (0.89,0.97)	0.88 (0.82,0.92)	0.78 (0.72,0.84)	0.65 (0.58,0.71)	0.49 (0.41,0.57)

		Respondent's Conservativeness				
		1	2	3	4	5
Non-Christian	Pr(Dom. = 1)	0.95 (0.92,0.98)	0.88 (0.82,0.92)	0.74 (0.67,0.81)	0.55 (0.46,0.64)	0.36 (0.25,0.46)
Non-Ev. Christian	Pr(Dom. = 1)	0.97 (0.94,0.98)	0.91 (0.87,0.94)	0.79 (0.74,0.84)	0.62 (0.56,0.68)	0.42 (0.34,0.49)
Evangelical	Pr(Dom. = 1)	0.95 (0.91,0.98)	0.87 (0.82,0.92)	0.74 (0.67,0.80)	0.55 (0.48,0.62)	0.35 (0.28,0.43)

Predicted probability that each religious group supports international (top) and domestic (bottom) climate change efforts, for each level of Conservatism, with 5 indicating the most conservative. Predictions are generated by estimates from models 4 and 8. 95% confidence intervals for each estimate included in parentheses. Predictions hold all other continuous variables at sample mean, and binary variables at sample mode. "Dom." indicates regression uses the survey question on domestic reductions as the dependent variable. "Int." indicates the question on international reductions.

Table 6: Effect of Liberal, Christian, Evangelical on Support for GHG Reduction, with Region Fixed Effects

	Domestic			International		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conservative	-.895 (.080)***	-.909 (.083)***	-.870 (.082)***	-.761 (.084)***	-.760 (.086)***	-.714 (.085)***
Christian		.151 (.195)			-.009 (.216)	
NonevChr						
Evangelical			-.256 (.143)*			-.490 (.150)***
Employed	.160 (.144)	.157 (.144)	.152 (.144)	.088 (.155)	.089 (.155)	.073 (.155)
Age	-.006 (.004)	-.007 (.004)	-.006 (.004)	-.006 (.005)	-.006 (.005)	-.006 (.005)
White	-.200 (.162)	-.198 (.162)	-.218 (.163)	.276 (.168)	.276 (.168)	.245 (.169)
Male	-.304 (.130)**	-.298 (.130)**	-.320 (.130)**	-.171 (.138)	-.172 (.139)	-.203 (.139)
Income	-.003 (.017)	-.003 (.017)	-.007 (.017)	-.018 (.018)	-.018 (.018)	-.025 (.018)
Married	-.188 (.146)	-.190 (.146)	-.161 (.147)	-.322 (.159)**	-.321 (.159)**	-.268 (.160)*
e(N)	1434	1434	1434	1456	1456	1456

Standard errors from fixed effects logit regression in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** represent p-values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. ‘Domestic’ indicates regression uses the survey question on domestic reductions as the dependent variable. ‘International’ indicates the question on international reductions.

Table 7: Effect of Ideology and Evangelical on Support for GHG Reduction, with Fox News Interactions

	Domestic		International	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conservative	-.274 (.096)***	-.241 (.099)**	-.192 (.101)*	-.160 (.104)
Con.*Fox	-.073 (.030)**	-.079 (.031)**	-.063 (.031)**	-.064 (.031)**
Fox	.158 (.110)	.160 (.111)	.109 (.113)	.100 (.113)
Christian				
Evangelical		-.297 (.192)		-.357 (.198)*
Ev.*Fox		.051 (.056)		.030 (.057)
Employed	.077 (.085)	.076 (.085)	.031 (.089)	.029 (.090)
Age	-.002 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)
White	-.075 (.092)	-.083 (.092)	.150 (.094)	.135 (.095)
Male	-.130 (.077)*	-.141 (.077)*	-.068 (.080)	-.084 (.080)
Income	.002 (.010)	.0001 (.010)	-.006 (.010)	-.010 (.011)
Married	-.127 (.086)	-.113 (.086)	-.188 (.090)**	-.165 (.091)*
N	1417	1417	1438	1438

Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** represent p-values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. Column headers indicate the dependent variable used in the regression, either the domestic or international carbon reduction questions.

Table 8: Effect of Ideology and Evangelical on Support for GHG Reduction, including Catholic Dummy

	Domestic				International			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conservative	-.515 (.045)***	-.519 (.047)***	-.504 (.046)***	-.512 (.047)***	-.415 (.046)***	-.404 (.047)***	-.392 (.047)***	-.394 (.048)***
Christian		.035 (.117)				-.113 (.124)		
Evangelical			-.103 (.092)	-.030 (.126)			-.238 (.093)**	-.220 (.132)*
Catholic	.157 (.079)**	.149 (.084)*	.118 (.086)	.078 (.098)	.160 (.082)*	.186 (.087)**	.068 (.090)	.058 (.102)
Employed	.087 (.084)	.086 (.084)	.085 (.084)	.083 (.084)	.038 (.088)	.040 (.088)	.035 (.088)	.034 (.088)
Age	-.004 (.002)	-.004 (.002)	-.004 (.002)	-.004 (.002)	-.004 (.003)	-.003 (.003)	-.004 (.003)	-.004 (.003)
White	-.065 (.091)	-.066 (.091)	-.073 (.091)	-.077 (.091)	.164 (.094)*	.167 (.094)*	.148 (.094)	.147 (.094)
Male	-.168 (.076)**	-.166 (.076)**	-.174 (.076)**	-.171 (.076)**	-.101 (.079)	-.105 (.079)	-.114 (.079)	-.113 (.079)
Income	-.002 (.010)	-.002 (.010)	-.003 (.010)	-.003 (.010)	-.009 (.010)	-.009 (.010)	-.011 (.010)	-.011 (.010)
Married	-.104 (.085)	-.105 (.085)	-.096 (.085)	-.096 (.085)	-.157 (.089)*	-.153 (.089)*	-.140 (.090)	-.140 (.090)
N	1434	1434	1434	1434	1456	1456	1456	1456

Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** represent p-values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. "Dom." indicates regression uses the survey question on domestic reductions as the dependent variable. "Int." indicates the question on international reductions.

Table 9: Effect of Ideology and Evangelical on Climate Change Skepticism

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conservative	.241 (.043)***	.229 (.045)***	.219 (.044)***	.214 (.045)***
Christian		.135 (.114)		
Evangelical			.225 (.084)***	.282 (.128)**
Employed	-.161 (.085)*	-.165 (.085)*	-.155 (.085)*	-.157 (.085)*
Age	-.005 (.002)**	-.006 (.002)**	-.005 (.002)**	-.005 (.002)**
White	-.040 (.091)	-.039 (.091)	-.026 (.091)	-.026 (.091)
Male	.095 (.077)	.101 (.077)	.109 (.077)	.111 (.077)
Income	.015 (.010)	.015 (.010)	.018 (.010)*	.018 (.010)*
Married	.024 (.086)	.021 (.086)	.0005 (.086)	.0003 (.087)
N	1449	1449	1449	1449

Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. *, **, and *** represent p-values of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. Regressions use the survey question on skepticism over global warming as the dependent variable.